BOOK REVIEWS.
THE RULE-MAKING AUTHORIrY IN THE ENGLISH SUPREME CouRT. By
Rosenbaum. Pp. xiv, 321. Boston: The Boston Book Co., 1917.

Samuel

Liberal samples of Mr. Rosenbaum's studies of English civil procedure
have already been presented to readers of the LAw REVIEW. Three chapters
of this compilation were originally published in English legal journals. The
title chosen for the compilation does not fully reveal the inclusive nature of
the work which traces the result of judicial rule-making thoroughly and critically through what has been the most fruitful and triumphant period of
British judicial administration.
The preface, written by T. Willes Chitty, master and editor of the Yearly
Practice, shows the exceptional facilities which the author enjoyed. No English lawyer had ever attempted to sum up and estimate the period following
the adoption of the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875. While this situation
implied pioneer research, it was offset by the willing assistance afforded by
eminent authorities, men whose experience spans all or nearly all of this remarkable period. The result is one of those rare accomplishments of an
alien scholar in an exceedingly technical field.
From the standpoint of American needs no native could have handled the
subject so well; he probably would not have conceived it as one primarily
relating to judicial responsibility. More readily than English lawyers we
can understand that the relationship between court-made rules and judicial
efficiency is one of cause and effect, for we have little of either in our typical
state system.

Of course it will not do to overlook the unification of English courts
under the Judicature Acts as a prerequisite for the exercise of the rulemaking power-and this is set forth in an early chapter of the book-but the
outstanding difference between our system and that prevailing in Great Britain
and the numerous associated commonwealths is that we still adhere for the
most part to statutory procedure, while they look to the courts for rational
evolution in the machinery of justice. The difference is the difference between
inexpertness and expertness in rule drafting, between irresponsibility and responsibility in the administration of justice. While we still squander energy
in litigating unessentials of procedure, in British courts around the world litigation is practically confined to substantial issues.
By the year 1887 reform in English courts had reached a state to justify
the estimate of Lord Bowen, who said: "It may be said without fear of contradiction that it is not possible in the year 1887 for an honest litigant in Her
Majesty's Supreme Court to be defeated by any mere technicality, any slip,
any mistaken step in his litigation. . . law has ceased to be a scientific game
that may be won or lost by playing some particular move." (P. 27o.)
In justice to Mr. Rosenbaum it must be said that he assumes no thesis.
His study is in the scientific spirit and the missteps taken at times and the
omissions still remaining are set down frankly. The author's literary skill is
such as to make fairly entertaining a study which would seem necessarily
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prosaic, while his account is so faithful and complete that no American lawyer, seeking to understand the English system, can do without this book.
Only by tracing the subject historically and critically can one understand
such a thing as the early willingness to dispense with pleadings in certain
causes and the success of efforts in this direction.
The actual constitution of the rule-making authority is a matter of the
greatest present interest to progressive lawyers in a number of states.
Chapter XVI, entitled Rule-Making in the Courts of the Empire, is especially
informative. Here is related briefly the operation of the principle in Scotland, Ireland, the Canadian provinces, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa,
India, and the island possession§ of the Pacific and the Caribbean. Various
experiments have been made in respect to the make-up of the rules committee. There is still agitation on this point at home. Success has undoubtedly attended the coupling of the bar with the bench. In all these experiments there are lessons for American lawyers now approaching a new era
which promises ultimate success, but" undoubtedly has its own special risks.
Emphasis falls upon organized responsibility. Our decentralized judicial
systems cannot easily assume this new and necessary function of regulating
procedure. While we cannot imitate the forms worked out in British jurisdictions we can accept the principles involved and work them out in practical fashion.
The thoroughness of the author's work is evidenced by the fullness of
citations backed up by tables of cases, statutes, and books to which reference
is made. The style of composition is admirable, but upon this readers of
the LAW REVIEw have had opportunity already to bestow appreciation.
Herbert Harley.
I
Chicago.

A

TREATISE ON THE REscIssIoN OF CONTRACTS AND CANCELLATION OF WRITTEN
INSTRUMENTS. By Henry Campbell Black. Vol. I, Pp. xxvi 837. Vol.

11, Pp. xiv, 837 to 1779. Kansas City, Mo.: Vernon Law Book Co., 1916.
To the practicing lawyer Mr. Black's publication will prove valuable in
several ways. It is a very complete index-digest of the law of Rescission
and Cancellation, and it deals sufficiently with general principles to enable the
mere plodder along the dusty highway to scent broad fields of legal speculation and theory which lie beyond the boundary lines of precedent and judicial
decision. The subject has not heretofore been separately treated, and as it
forms a very important part of the private law and is the basis of much
litigation, Mr. Black's volume cannot fail to prove useful to the bar.
With this acknowledgment of its unquestionable value to the working
lawyer is coupled an expression of regret that it is not the text-book that
the student needs or is awaiting. Unfortunately, text-writers, like our
author, assume the yoke of the law that is imposed by the courts and give
us a restatement of judicial decision and reasoning instead of a treatment
of the subject matter from the point of view of the investigator and scholar
who, like Professor Wigmore in his monumental work on Evidence, seeks
everywhere for light which may bring out the principle which is the ultimate
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object of his search. One may read a book like Mr. Black's without being
aware of the fact that scores of valuable articles that would illuminate his
special sub-topics lie buried in the periodical legal literature. It is only by
a use of this literature as well as of the literature of comparative jurisprudence and of the opinions and speculations of publicists, economists and
theorists that any real advance in the science of the law can be made. Judge
Story is quoted by Judge Keener as having said "tell me not of the last-cited
case having overruled any great principle,-not at all. Give me the principle,
even if you find it laid down in the institutes of Hindu law." There is no
doubt that eventuallr legal writers will lam to use this great and growing
periodical literature and will no longer confine themselves merely to reproducing the opinions of our courts.
David Werner Arnram.
By John Nolen and Frank B. Williams. Pp. xx, i59. Bridgeport, Conn.: City Planning Commission,
i916.
Laborers sent to the city's almshouse because they could not at the prevailing rate of wages for unskilled labor ($12 a week) afford to rent a
home, a situation declared not to be unique, is the compelling reason Mr.
Nolen gives to the citizens of Bridgeport, Connecticut, for real planning by and
for the city of the future. The city at present with a population of 15o,ooo
(an increase of fifty per cent. in twenty war months) expects soon to have
a population of 25o,ooo. The main survey, "Better City Planning for Bridgeport" (1916), should be read in connection with the preliminary report made
in January of i915.
The report is interesting in content and both aptly and amply illustrated.
Mr. Nolen in planning his main thoroughfares, works them out along the
lines of the following principles: (I) That all main lines must be planned
by some central city authority; (2) that arterial streets and roads must be
adequate not only for present, but also for future needs of inter-communication ;. (3) that efficiency now requires separate lines and tracks for the three
vehicles of three distinct speeds; (4) that minor roads should be gathered
up into secondary streets and brought into main thoroughfares only at fairly
long intervals, in order to decrease danger and delay; (5) that at these junctions ample space for traffic should be provided; (6) that these main thoroughfares should include a view not only of industrial and residential districts, but also of areas for recreation; (7) that a system of varying street
widths is more efficient and more economical and more stable; (8) that in
new suburban areas adequate widths on the main roads should be provided.
In other words, the city planning of the present day plans not so much for
beauty, though not neglectful of beauty, as for utility. Zones are provided
for business and industrial districts, for parks and open spaces, for first and
for second residential districts and for tenement districts. All are properly
located with a view to traffic, access to industrial plants, prevailing wants,
transportation facilities and needs, etc. The legal means to be adopted for
carrying out the plans are also included as are the plans for financing the
BETTER CITY PLANNING FOR BRIDGEPORT.
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necessary changes. The happy departure is that the Planning Commission,
which employed Mr. Nolen, puts in the footnotes their agreement or disagreement with his main recommendations, thus in effect making Mr. Nolen's personal report in a true sense the report of the Commission.
Clyde L. King.
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE LAWYER-STATESMAN. By John T. Richard. Pp. vii,
26o. New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1916.
To those who are accustomed to look upon the Great Emancipator as a
great lawyer and a great statesman, this book, while interesting and instructive,
performs no great service; to the many who have been led to doubt his ability
as a lawyer and his high standing in the legal profession, this book will prove
little short of a revelation. It is written with one purpose in view, to disprove
the statements so often made that Abraham Lincoln was but a mediocre
lawyer and to demonstrate that on the contrary he was possessed of all the
mental and moral attributes that go to make a distinguished lawyer and that
he met with that success in practice which is only acquired by the foremost
members of the bar. The author, himself a lawyer, held a brief when he
wrote, and it is safe to say that he has proved his case beyond a doubt.
Logically, the book begins with Lincoln's legal training. Next follows a
complete account of his actual practice in the courts of Illinois, both nisi prius
and appellate, and in the Supreme Court of the United States, as far as such
a record can be completed from the sources that are now available. Mr.
Richards proves from the cases themselves and from the contemporary and
subsequent tributes of others, that Mr. Lincoln possessed all the technical
skill, the searching analysis, the frankness and the candor which, coupled
with his unusual ability to state principles with the utmost clearness and simplicity, stamped him a real leader of the profession. This is supported by a
demonstration of the logical and lawyer-like attitude which Lincoln, the president, tool toward all constitutional questions that confronted him in that high
office. There is also a chapter in which Mr. Richards defends and explains
Lincoln's attitude toward the Dred Scott decision, which position has been
called by some a criticism of the judiciary. The book ends with a tribute to
the man as an orator.
Probably that which is of most practical value in the work is a complete
list and digest of every case in which Lincoln appeared in the appellate court
of Illinois and in the Supreme Court. Another important contribution is the
information the author gives in regard to the precise time of Lincoln's admission to the bar. The entire work represents a great amount of research and
investigation, and helps to throw new light upon the greatest figure in our
L.B.S.
American history.
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THE ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE.

Edition.

Pp. xxv, 454.

By Thomas Erskine Holland. Twelfth

New York:

Oxford University Press, 1917.

Professor Holland's text-book on Jurisprudence is so well known; its
reputation so thoroughly established that an extended review of the twelfth
edition just issued from the Oxford University Press seems hardly necessary.
The learned author states, however, that this text may be regarded as final,
and as a consequence there is evidence of careful thought in producing a text
which, in so far as it presents the author's views, may be regarded as word
perfect. In the notes and occasionally in the text will be found changes suggested by the recent literature on jurisprudence and some material suggested
by the great war now in progress. Legal methodology has a very slight appeal to the English and American Bar, hence it is somewhat to be regretted
that the foremost systematic writer in our language should occasionally reduce his discussion to a degree of abstractness that has been complained of
as dry. However, in no other form is there presented a comparative view of
civil and common law, so compact and clear. Hence, to the student who is
completing his studies and wishes to round them out, with a view of the law
as a whole, this work will be most valuable, as it has, in fact, proved itself in
W. H. L.
the past.

By George P. Costigan, Jr., Professor of Law in
the Northwestern University. American Case-Book Series. West Pub-

CASES ON LEGAL ETHICS.

lishing Co., i917.

This case-book marks an epoch in the study of Legal Ethics. For
the past ten or fifteen years, Bar Associations generally have been urging
more methodical study of this important subject. In the last two or
three years, tentative courses on the subject have been given, among other
institutions, in the University of Pennsylvania Law School. Now for
the first time, a case-book has been published in which some of the
authorities have been conveniently collected for the use of both students and
instructors in this subject. The author has made excellent use of the material
including, in addition to numerous cases, on the one hand, the canons of the
American Bar Association and the questions addressed to the New York
Committee with their answers, and on the other hand including a number of
references to authorities not in the form of judicial decisions. The general
arrangement of the subject is that which is familiar to students of the subject; it has always seemed to the Reviewer that it would have assisted in
clearness, had the canons of the American Bar Association been arranged in
some more logical and helpful order.
An interesting item is the list of fifty resolutions written, by David Hoffman, of the Baltimore Bar, in which many problems of Legal Ethics are
stated in very concrete and useful form, though some, perhaps, would not
be universally accepted at the present day. The canons of the American Bar
Association are grouped together in an Appendix with a few annotations,
which may render them more helpful. The Reviewer believes that the study
of this subject-is one which is going to claim more and more attention in the
various Law Schools in the future.
R. D.B.
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Selected and annotated by William H. Loyd,
Professor of Law in the University of Pennsylvania. The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, Indianapolis, i917. Pp. 949.
This is not a case book on pleading or on practice. It covers the general
field in which they are both included, presenting cases on what may be called
the substantive part of adjective law. Mr. Loyd has selected for especial treatment the topics of Courts, Parties, Actions, .Trial, Judgment, Execution, and
Appeal and Error; he excludes Pleading as being amply treated in other
collections on the common law and code varieties, between which an instructor
must choose, and, after commencement of actions, except for a few cases on
statement of claim, he leaps directly to the subject of trial and the subsequent
steps in an action. This leaves him free to devote more space and detail to
the later stages of a contentious proceeding, to which the minds of students
have hitherto been insufficiently directed, and enables him to present a compilation whose range, in one volume, is probably unique.
For the cases on post-trial procedure the book ought to be of service to;
practitioners as well as students; the volume of decisions the courts are rendering on those points is the best proof that it is a subject of which the
essentials are not clearly perceived by the average lawyer.
But after all a case book is for students, and their needs should be the
guiding principle in selection. Mr. Loyd has consistently kept that thought
before him. There is a merciful minimum of black letter law, for however
valuable and romantic are those landmarks of jurisprudence in the year-bdoks,
they occasion students at the school age little more than mystification and
conjectural distress; the compiler is to be thanked for not yieldinig to the
attractive temptation before every solid historian of civil procedure to make
much of his knowledge of early beginnings. In place of these cases Mr. Loyd
furnishes an ample substitute in printing many in which "the essay that goes
with the decision" (to quote the familiar phrase of Dean Lewis) lucidly
reviews the history and authorities of the subject. But he has also inserted
a sufficient number of cases themselves raising points of difficulty to accomplish both objects of a case book-instruction for the lawyer's equipment, and
exercise for his proficiency.
Another concession to law school students for which Mr. Loyd will be
devoutly thanked is the frequent and consistent reference in the footnotes
at the commencement of each topic to all the standard text books of real
value, with enumeration of chapter and section in point. This will be a great
assistance, especially to first-year men, who are usually plunged into a morass
of cases on civil procedure without knowledge of either legal principles or
legal lingo to which to clifig. The case system at best leaves on a student's
mind a picture of any field of law exceedingly patchy and impressionistic; it
must be recognized even by its most passionate admirers that case-law needs
some corrective. Perhaps Mr. Loyd's method will furnish it without unduly
offending the irreconcilables, some of whom profess to look upon all textbooks with suspicion, if not with contempt, and, at least in class, affect complete ignorance of their existence. Besides referring to text-books Mr. Loyd
makes frequent reference to the wealth of monographs contained in law
review publications.
CASES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE.
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The footnotes also offer frequent quotations from American codes such
as those of New York and California, and citations to still others, to illustrate
the manner in which statutes have met the obstacles presented by the common
law. These are valuable, too, for stirring up in the minds of future practitioners the thought that other jurisdictions than their own may well be
regarded with profit for the improvement of deficiencies that arise in the local
practice machinery. Especially helpful in this regard are Mr. Loyd's careful
and accurate references all through the book to details of English practice-a'
system which is more and more being'recognized as the model that all American states must follow as inevitably as they did the New York code of 1848.
He cites many rules by number, quotes fully from others, and always supplies
decisions of the English court in exegesis. A careful reading of these references by one familiar with the English rules reveals the fact that they are
always reliable and apt, and show a thorough comprehension of the method
of the English practice. A few English citations might usefully be added,
such as to the practice of making declaratory orders (page 33), a partnership
suing and being sued under the firm name (page 4o), the functions of the
official referee (page 338), third party procedure (page 613), 'etc.
How refreshing an influence the study of the English rules can be is well
illustrated by two cases in the book, on the subject of prejudicial error. In
the first, Bindbeutal v. St. Ry. Co. (page 89o), a Missouri appellate court
tortures both language and logic into the conclusion that error in a record
must be presumed to be prejudicial, and the footnotes give an appalling array
of state courts in accord; in the second, a federal judge in Press Pub. Co. v.
Monteith (page 893), refers to the English rule that: "A new trial shall not
be granted on the ground of the misdirection of the jury or of the improper
admission or rejection of evidence, unless in the opinion of the court to which
the application is made, some substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has
been thereby occasioned on the trial," and he declares it to be "the more
rational and enlightened view" that prejudice must be shown to be substantial,
not merely presumed.
There is a useful short appendix of forms ancient and modern.
Samuel Rosenbaum.
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